The Interpretation of Logophoric self-Forms, and some Consequences for a Model of Reference and Denotation

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Abstract

Logophoric self-forms have been shown to behave semantically as if they were phrasal constituents made up of a simple pronoun *him/her* and an intensifying self-form, i.e. an adjunct as in the president himself. This point of view allows us to reconsider the distribution of logophoric self in a new light, the crucial question being: Why are intensifiers used in logophoric contexts? It is argued that intensifiers are licensed whenever the referent x of their head DP is contrasted with some alternative referent y that is a function of x. We consequently have to show in how far discourse participants standing in a paradigmatic contrast to the referent of a logophoric self-form (the ‘assigned epistemic validator’) can be described as functions of that referent. It is claimed that all DPs occurring in a logophoric environment are interpreted relative to the epistemic validator insofar as it is the validator who attributes the properties expressed in the relevant descriptions to their referents. This claim has some implications for a model of reference and denotation, e.g. concerning the interpretation of DPs in general, and the relation between a ‘referential act’ on the one hand and the descriptions used in such acts on the other.

1. Introduction

Self-forms as in (1) have been referred to using a wide range of labels like ‘semi-emphatic reflexive pronouns’ (Quirk et al., 1985), ‘long-distance-bound reflexives’ (Zribi-Hertz, 1989), ‘untriggered reflexive pronouns’ (Parker et al., 1990), ‘logophors’ (Reinhart & Reuland, 1991, 1993), ‘locally free reflexives’ (Baker, 1995; König & Siemund, 2000), and ‘override reflexives’ (Huddleston & Pullum, 2002), among other terms. Not all of these notions are equivalent, since they apply to different distributional subsets of self-forms, but all of them refer to occurrences of self that are generally regarded as regular exceptions to Chomsky’s (1981, 1986) Binding Condition A.1

(1) Hugo looked at his contemporaries, less clever than himself, and saw them outstrip him. [BNC C8S 1102]

This paper is concerned with those instances of (untriggered) self-forms that are often called ‘logophoric’. Logophoric self-forms refer to an ‘assigned epistemic validator’ (Stirling, 1993; cf. below), i.e. to some (conscious) entity from whose perspective a given state of affairs is reported or considered (in (1), Hugo). Such forms are typically found in (inherently) contrastive contexts, for example in coordinations and lists, in combination with comparatives and markers of exception or inclusion, and with focus particles like only or even (cf. Quirk et al., 1985: 359f.; Huddleston & Pullum, 2002: 1495f.; König & Siemund, 2000: 189ff.).

There seems to be general agreement that not all locally free self-forms are logophoric (cf. Baker, 1995; König & Siemund, 2000; Hole, 2002b). However, it is less clear whether all logophoric self-forms are locally free. Consider (2), where herself is locally bound, thus abiding by Chomsky’s Binding Condition A; but is it also logophoric, in the sense that it refers back to the ‘assigned epistemic validator’ Mary?

(2) Mary, realized that she, hated herself, more than anyone in the world.

One might be tempted to assume that logophoric and locally bound self-forms are in complementary distribution, since logophoric self is supposedly illicit when it ‘occupies a position on the θ-grid of the verb” (Reinhart & Reuland, 1991: 313). However, Zribi-Hertz (1989) and Baker (1995), among others, have shown that this is actually not true, and that both types of self-forms can occur in the same syntactic environments if appropriate context is provided. (3) is therefore ambiguous:

(3) John, thinks that Paul, hates himself, more than anyone in the world. (Zribi-Hertz, 1989: 719)

If himself in (3) can be interpreted as being logophoric, there is no good reason why herself in (2) should not be regarded as referring back to the assigned epistemic validator Mary. The difference is that herself in (2) is both locally bound and logophoric while those two interpretations are mutually exclusive in (3), where the assigned epistemic validator and the local antecedent are different. In view of such facts, it seems to me that logophoric self is hard to define in distributional terms, and I will provide the following semantic definition:

D1 A self-form is logophoric iff it refers to the ‘assigned epistemic validator’ of a discourse segment.

The notion of an ‘assigned epistemic validator’, or ‘validator’ for short, is borrowed from Stirling (1993). It refers to the entity that takes responsibility for the ascription of truth-values to propositions in a given discourse segment. In the context of the referential interpretation of DPs, the validator is the person that attributes properties to individuals in order to identify those individuals. In a model-theoretic framework, the validator is the entity that associates intensional meanings with extensional meanings, relative to a world-time pair.

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1 “An anaphor is bound in its governing category” (Chomsky, 1981: 188).

2 I will use logophoric self as a generic term for logophoric self-forms.
The term ‘validator’ is, by and large, equivalent to Zrizi-Hertz’s (1989) ‘(minimal) subject of consciousness’, but it approaches the issue from a different perspective. The latter term has specific cognitive implications, while the validator can be defined using the notion of ‘responsibility’. The definition given in D2 paraphrases Stirling’s (1993: 282f.) own definition, making use of the distinction between intensional and extensional meanings (I use Montague’s intensional operator ^).

D2 The assigned epistemic validator is the entity that takes responsibility for the appropriateness of an intensional meaning [[‘x’]] in relation to an extensional meaning [[α]], for a given stretch of discourse D.

The notion of ‘responsibility’ is to be understood in a sociological or even legal sense: in making utterances, speakers describe states of affairs, and they are held responsible for what they say. It should be noted that this notion of ‘responsibility’ is defined in extra-linguistic terms, but has clear linguistic reflexes. For example, a description and definition of commissive speech acts (or a description of the verb promise) will necessarily make reference to social responsibility or some derive thereof.

The validator is typically, but not necessarily, identical to the speaker. The reason is that speakers may quote utterances made by others, in which case they distance themselves from what is said — for example, by embedding the relevant proposition under an operator of (in)direct speech (cf. (4a)), or by relativizing their utterance using an epistemic disclaimer like according to (cf. (4b)). The ‘epistemic indirectness’ of utterances like those in (4) constitutes the very essence of logophoricity:

(4) a. Fred: John said that Bill is a liar.
   b. Fred: According to John, Bill is a liar.

The highest level propositions expressed in (4a) and (4b) are claimed to be true by Fred, and Fred will have to assume responsibility for their propositional content. In the embedded proposition (‘Bill is a liar’), however, Fred explicitly ‘delegates’ this responsibility to John. Pieces of information that are associated with a given assigned epistemic validator will be enclosed by square brackets, and the relevant validator will be added as a superscript to those brackets. This is illustrated for (4a) in (5):

(5) Fred: [John said that [Bill is a liar]_{John}^{Fred}

We are now in a position to define the notion ‘logophoric context’: a context is logophoric iff the validator ‘controlling’ (i.e., taking responsibility for) the relevant discourse segment is different from the highest-level validator, viz. the speaker. In (6), only β is logophoric, while α and γ are non-logophoric.

(6) [[ α ]]β [ γ ]γ

It should be noted that propositions that are embedded under some logophoric operator are not necessarily, but only potentially, logophoric, since the thoughts or words of discourse participants can be represented in a mode of presentation that corresponds to the speaker’s perspective. We will return to this point below.

Potentially logophoric contexts include both indirect speech and so-called ‘free indirect style’, where no verb of communication or cognition is explicitly mentioned. (7) is a case in point. I provide extensive context in order to illustrate the logophoric nature of the text, which is reflected linguistically in the use of specific tense forms (She had gone about...). (7) could be paraphrased by embedding the whole paragraph under a verb of thinking, replacing the third person forms with first person pronouns, and changing the tense forms accordingly: She thought: ‘I have gone about this project...’.

(7) She had gone about this project in entirely the wrong manner. But if she’d been frank from the outset and had admitted to him that she’d been sent by his stepmother with the plea for him to visit her the result would have been short and sharp. Bertha would have been sent the message that she could go hopping sideways while she herself would have been told to get down the road and out of his sight. [BNC HHB 1561]

2. Logophoric self-forms as triggers or reflexes of logophoricity

Before considering the semantics of logophoric self, I would like to briefly address the ‘relation of causality’ holding between logophoric self-forms on the one hand and logophoric contexts on the other. Does logophoric self trigger a logophoric reading of a discourse segment, or is it merely a reflex of logophoricity? As can be seen from examples like (7), logophoricity is not contingent upon the presence of a logophoric self-form, so the null hypothesis is that logophoric self reflects, but does not trigger, logophoricity. However, there are contexts in which a self-form can indicate a logophoric reading of a proposition if the relevant context is potentially, but not explicitly, logophoric. Consider (8):

(8) Jack thought that this fool was richer than him.

On the one hand, the DP this fool could be interpreted in such a way that it refers to ‘the individual x such that the speaker considers x to be a fool’ (the non-logophoric reading or speaker’s perspective). On the other hand, this fool could refer to ‘the individual x such that Jack considers x to be a fool’ (logophoric interpretation). This ambiguity is represented in (9), using the notational convention introduced in (5) above:

(9) a. [Jack thought that [this fool was richer than him]_{speaker}^{speaker}
   b. [Jack thought that [this fool was richer than him]_{Jack}^{speak}

If we replace him with himself, the resulting sentence is unambiguously logophoric:

(10) Jack thought that this fool was richer than himself.

The logophoric interpretation of (10) seems to be a function of the presence of himself. However, it would be misleading to say that himself ‘triggers’ logophoricity in (10). (8) is potentially logophoric, while (10) is necessarily logophoric, since otherwise the self-form would be unlicensed. Himself, thus, induces a logophoric reading by way of inference.

3 I disregard the deictic nature of the DP, which is not crucial in this context.
3. An analysis of logophoric self-forms as intensifiers with a lexically incorporated pronominal head

It is standardly assumed in reference grammars of English that logophoric self behaves semantically like a pronoun plus an intensifier (e.g. Quirk et al., 1985: 359). In using the term ‘intensifier’ I refer to self-forms like the one in (11), i.e. to self-forms that adjoin to a DP and form an endocentric expansion of that DP.

(11) \[[The president]\_DP himself\_DP opened the meeting.\]

In accordance with the viewpoint that logophoric self semantically corresponds to the combination of a free pronoun and an intensifier, himself in (1) above can be paraphrased as shown in (1’):

(1’) Hugo looked at his contemporaries, who were less clever than he himself was, and saw them outstrip him.

An analysis of logophoric self along the lines pointed out above has been defended by Baker (1995), König & Siemund (2000), and Hole (2002b), among others, and is supported by comparative evidence. In many languages which (unlike English) differentiate formally between intensifiers and reflexives, logophoric self-forms are in fact translated using a pronoun plus an intensifier. The German translation of the English example (12a), given in (12b), may serve to illustrate this point.

(12) a. Fred knew that Bill was smarter than himself.
   b. Fred wusste, dass Bill schlauer war als er selbst.

If we assume that logophoric self-forms are really ‘reduced’ DPs of the form [DP x-self] (i.e. himself = him himself), it is of course necessary to consider their structure in more detail. There seem to be three options: First, we could claim that himself in (12a) is a ‘real’ intensifier which adjoins to a phonologically empty element – say, pro – so the syntax of that constituent would be something like [pro\_DP himself\_DP]. Second, we could argue that himself can be morphologically divided into a pronoun him and an intensifier self; so the structure would be [(him)\_DP self\_DP]. And third, we could assume that logophoric self-forms are lexicalized expressions with a compositional semantics.

In the first case, we would have to make a good argument as to where the phonologically empty element (pro) of category DP comes from, since such elements are generally considered to be alien to English grammar (English is not a pro-drop language). If we adopt the second point of view, we are bound to assume that English has two formally distinct intensifiers (x-self and self). Moreover, we will have to explain why the supposed intensifier self adjoins only to specific pronouns, and why we find the (unexpected) possessive forms myself, yourself etc. in non-third person contexts. I will therefore go for option number three. The reason for the existence of such lexicalized expressions with a compositional semantics has to be sought in the history of English. In a nutshell, the originally monomorphemic intensifier self/see/te/sole/syl of Old English was ‘enriched’ with a pronominal copy of the head DP. For example, the Old English intensifier construction godd see/te (‘God himself’) was replaced by godd him see/te (cf. Keenan, 2001: 10).

By way of univerbation, these constituents developed into the series of complex forms himself, herself etc. of Modern English. However, the process of ‘pronoun doubling’, which gave rise to the creation of complex self-forms in combination with full DPs, was contextually restricted and did not take place when an object pronoun like hine (accusative) or him (dative) was intensified; i.e. combinations like *hine him self-ne were not established as a part of English grammar. Instead, the (locally free) pronouns him/her etc. themselves combined with the (monomorphemic) intensifier self. The resulting forms are therefore formally indistinguishable from intensifying self-adjuncts, but their distribution resembles that of free pronouns.

Under the hypothesis that himself/herself etc. is ‘lexically complex’, it is necessary to assume an additional lexical entry for self besides the intensifier and reflexive readings. This third entry could be represented as shown in (13) (the subscript log is added in order to distinguish the logophoric self-forms from the reflexive and intensifying ones):

(13) \[[my\_log]\_DP = [me myself]\_DP\]
   \[[you\_log]\_DP = [you yourself]\_DP\]
   \[[him\_log]\_DP = [him himself]\_DP\]
   \[[her\_log]\_DP = [her herself]\_DP\]
   \[[it\_log]\_DP = [it itself]\_DP\]
   etc.

Let us briefly summarize the presuppositions and claims made so far: First, I have defined logophoric self-forms as a semantic class, making use of the notion of an ‘assigned epistemic validator’; second, I have argued that logophoric self is a reflex, not a trigger, of logophoricity, although it may indicate a logophoric reading of a discourse segment by way of inference; and third, I have subscribed to the group of linguists who believe that logophoric self can be analyzed compositionally, and that the relevant forms are interpreted as combinations of a pronoun and an intensifier. This claim, however, raises another question: Why is it that intensifiers are used (or licensed) in logophoric contexts? In order to answer this question, we will have to give an account of the semantics of intensifiers. This will be undertaken in the next section.

4. Intensifiers as expressions of an identity function

The semantics of intensifiers have puzzled linguists for a relatively long time. Edmondson & Plank (1978) have argued that intensifiers are scalar expressions similar to a focus particle like even, and that they are used when the referent of the relevant head DP is particularly unlikely or unexpected. That such approaches are doomed to failure can easily be seen when we consider examples like (14):

(14) Only the president himself is entitled to sign the contract.

Equally unpromising is the attempt to regard self-forms as ‘extensionalizers’, i.e. as expressions that block an ‘attributive’ interpretation, in the sense of Donnellan (1966). 4 (15) shows that intensifiers can easily be used in combination with ‘attributive definite descriptions’.

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König & Siemund have repeatedly argued that the function of intensifiers has to do with reference to alternatives, and that intensifiers are used to oppose some ‘central’ referent to a set of ‘peripheral’ entities (e.g. König & Siemund, 2000; Siemund, 2000). They have provided a typology of readings of intensifiers which explicates the idea of a ‘center-periphery’ contrast. Taking up some suggestions made by Baker (1995), König & Siemund distinguish between four instantiations of the ‘center-periphery’-relation (cf. (16)). Examples of each of the readings are provided in (17) (cf. König, 2001: 749).

(17) a. The Pope himself is against this view.
   b. Most of the passengers suffered light injuries. The driver himself was killed.
   c. Lunch hour rush. Marta’s tuna sandwiches in heavy demand. Marta herself everywhere and nowhere... 
   d. No. Carl Heine was not amiable, but neither was he a bad sort...He had been that way and then the war had come – the war Horace himself had been to.

While an analysis of intensifiers in terms of the contrast between a ‘center’ and a ‘periphery’ (or ‘entourage’) is very appealing for examples like (17a), it is less clearly applicable to occurrences of self-forms like the one in (17d), where it needs to be understood in a more metaphorical sense. The idea of a ‘center’ being opposed to a ‘periphery’ is therefore hard to falsify, and a technical implementation is virtually impossible to provide. Still, we will see below that the analysis proposed by König & Siemund can be made more explicit if it is rephrased in terms of a general theory of focus interpretation, in combination with a very parsimonious lexical semantics.

Hole (1999, 2002a) has provided an analysis of intensifiers that allows us to stick to the intuition of a ‘center-periphery relation’ as advocated by König & Siemund without giving up the strive for a falsifiable semantics (cf. also Eckardt, 2001). Hole argues that intensifiers denote the identity function ID, which takes a referent x as its argument and maps it onto itself (ID(x) = x). While this operation appears to be meaningless from a truth-conditional point of view, it becomes highly relevant when we consider the additional assumption that intensifying self-forms are always focused, which is reflected in their being invariably stressed. The result of such focusing is that reference is made to a set of alternative expressions that are of the same type as the focus denotation (cf. Rooth, 1985). Given that the identity function is of type \(<e,e>\) – i.e., it is a function from individuals to individuals – all alternative expressions will likewise be of type \(<e,e>\). Such functions are typically genitive expressions like brother of or part of. For illustration, consider the DP in (18):

(18) the president [himSELF];

According to Hole’s analysis, himself denotes the identity function ID, which takes the referent of the DP the president as its argument. Given that himself is in focus, a set of alternative functions like secretary of or wife of is evoked. If these functions are applied to [the president], they deliver individuals that can be conceived of as functions of the president, i.e. individuals that can be described or identified in terms of the president. This is shown in (19):

(19) denotation of the president himself:
   \[
   \text{ID([[the president]])} = \text{[[the president]]}
   \]
   alternatives to the president himself:
   \[
   \text{WIFE.Off([[the president]])} = \text{[[the president’s wife]]}
   \]
   \[
   \text{SEC.Off([[the president]])} = \text{[[the president’s secre.]]}
   \]

Hole’s analysis predicts that intensifiers will be used to relate a given referent x – the referent of the head DP – to a set of alternative referents y that stand in some (contextually salient) relation to x. By the same token, it predicts that the use of intensifiers will be infelicitous if no such contextually salient relation is recoverable. Consider (20):

(20) a. I like the surroundings of London much better than London itself.
   b. #I like the surroundings of London much better than Edinburgh itself.

In (20a), London itself contrasts with the surroundings of London. The intensifier is felicitous because London itself is opposed to a referential value that is a function of London (SURROUNDINGS.Off([[London]])). (20b) is infelicitous because Edinburgh cannot be conceived of as a function of London; i.e. there is no mode of presentation in which London forms part of a description of Edinburgh.5

Hole’s analysis allows us to rephrase König & Siemund’s analysis in more falsifiable terms: instead of saying that intensifiers are used to oppose ‘central’ to ‘peripheral’ referents, we can simply say that they oppose referents to alternative entities that can be conceived of as functions of those referents.

As has been shown by Gast (2002), Hole’s analysis can account for most occurrences of intensifiers. When we consider the four readings distinguished by König & Siemund (cf. (16) above), however, we notice that there is one class of self-forms which it cannot easily explain: Why is it that intensifiers are regularly used in logophoric contexts like in (17d)? In order to see the relevance of this question, consider (21):

(21) Mary thought that she herself was better qualified for the job than Jane.

According to Hole’s analysis, intensifiers are used to relate a referent x to a set of alternative referents that are functions of x. In (21), the referent of the DP she herself (Mary) stands in a paradigmatic contrast to Jane. In how far can Jane be conceived of as a function of Mary? This question brings us to the core issue of this paper, and it will be addressed in the next section.

5 Or at least such a description is not available without providing considerable amounts of contextual information, in which case the intensifier would become felicitous.
5. Why are intensifiers licensed in logophoric contexts?

In order to approach the central question of this section, let us start with a particularly typical example of a logophoric sentence. A specific type of evaluative expressions like fool or sexy is necessarily interpreted relative to some validator, since the extensions of such predicates differ from one individual to another. When such expressions are used in potentially logophoric contexts, there is a systematic ambiguity (Sells, 1987 uses such expressions as a diagnostic of logophoricity). This is illustrated in (22):

(22) a. Jane knew that the fool who was her husband would spoil her fun.
   b. Jane wanted to invite the sexiest man alive.

(22a) is ambiguous insofar as it is not clear who considers Jane’s husband to be a fool. In a non-logophoric reading, it is the speaker who attributes that property to Jane’s husband, while in the logophoric reading it is Jane who dislikes her husband. Similarly, the referential interpretation of the DP the sexiest man alive in (22b) depends on the identity of the validator (note that this problem is related to, but different from, Donnellan’s distinction between ‘referential’ and ‘attributive’ definite descriptions). In the framework used in this paper, the two readings of (22a) can be represented as in (23):

(23) a. [Jane knew that [the fool who was her husband would spoil her fun]speaker
   b. [Jane knew that [the fool who was her husband would spoil her fun]speaker

Examples like those in (22) illustrate that there are certain DPs that need to be interpreted relative to an assigned epistemic validator. Another way of paraphrasing this fact is to say that the referents of such DPs are invariably functions of an assigned epistemic validator. This brings us rather close to an answer to the question of why DPs referring to the validator may generally be intensified when they are contrasted with some other discourse participant – i.e., an answer to the question of why intensifiers are licensed in logophoric contexts. Recall from Section 4 that intensifiers can be used whenever the contrasting referent is a function of the referent of the intensified DP. We also captured this fact by saying that intensifiers are licensed whenever the referent contrasting with the referent x of the head DP of the intensifier can be identified in terms of a description which contains x. In the DPs exemplified above, this is obviously the case. The sexiest man alive should be identified more exactly as ‘the x such that Jane/the speaker considers x to be the sexiest man alive’, and the fool... should be described as ‘the x such that Jane/the speaker considers x to be a fool (and...)’.

So far, we have been concerned with a specific class of DPs that we have called ‘evaluative’. We will now have to consider referential descriptions that do not contain such ‘subjective’ components like fool or sexy. One might believe that such DPs are not interpreted relative to an assigned epistemic validator, but I will argue that (in logophoric contexts and possibly elsewhere) the differences between both classes of expressions are epiphenomenal. For a start, let us consider the DP in (24):

(24) the president of the US

The referential interpretation of the DP the president of the US appears to be independent of any particular validator. However, this is actually a (discourse pragmatic?) desideratum which is not met in actual language use. The reason is that speakers may refer to individuals using DPs which describe the relevant referents inaccurately. Donnellan’s (1966) well-known distinction between ‘attributive’ and ‘referential’ definite descriptions was designed to capture this fact. Remember Donnellan’s (1966: 287) example of the man drinking water, given here in (25):

(25) Who is the man drinking a Martini?

The addressee can successfully identify the referent in question because s/he is aware that to err is human. The DP the person drinking the Martini is interpreted as ‘the x such that the speaker believes that x is drinking Martini’, not as ‘the x such that x is drinking Martini’. In how far is this point relevant to logophoricity and the licensing of intensifiers? Let us return to our president-of-the-US example. Imagine the following scenario: Bill met some person in a pub outside London who resembles the president of the US, and he actually believes that this person was the president of the US. He now calls his friend Jack and tells him:

(26) The president of the US smashed a window in a pub outside London!

Let us assume that the drinker in the pub was actually not the president of the US. Under this assumption, the DP the president of the US in (26) is used inaccurately, as far as its extensional interpretation is concerned. But now, let us consider what happens if Jack calls his friend Fred, and he tells him about Bill’s having seen the president of the US smashing a window in a pub. Even though Jack does not believe that the person in question actually was the president of the US, he can nevertheless use the mode of presentation chosen by Bill without incurring the risk of providing inaccurate information:

(27) Jack: Bill told me that the president of the US (had) smashed a window in a pub outside London.

This point is both trivial and subtle: Jack uses the DP the president of the US to refer to some individual x. This individual x is claimed to have smashed a window by the assigned epistemic validator Bill. The DP is interpreted as ‘the x such that (the validator) Bill identifies x as the president of the US’. Given that this description is provided from the perspective of Bill, Jack need not worry about whether or not the person at issue really was the president of the US. Still, the DP in question refers to some individual; but it refers only relative to the assigned epistemic validator Bill; the relevant referent is, therefore, a function of Bill. Note that this is true even if Bill identifies the person in question correctly as the president of the US: it is still ‘the x such that Bill identifies x as the president of the US’.

We should finally consider a class of DPs that some readers may still assume to be interpreted independently of any particular validator: the class of proper names. In logophoric contexts proper names behave exactly like definite descriptions. Imagine the following situation: Jack saw a person on the street who he thought was Fred, but
who was actually Fred’s twin brother Bill. He now tells his wife:

(28) I saw Fred on the street.

If Jack’s wife quotes Fred’s utterance made in (28), the same situations obtains as above: She can use the rigid designator Fred without making any provisos because she is not to be held responsible for the fact that the person under discussion was really Fred. She merely claims that Jack told her that she saw some person which he identified as Fred. Again, the DP Fred is interpreted relative to an assigned epistemic validator.

To summarize, all DPs occurring in a logophoric environment are interpreted relative to the relevant assigned epistemic validator. This is why DPs referring to the validator can always be intensified if the validator is contrasted with some other discourse participant.

6. Summary and outlook

The main goal of this paper was to contribute to an understanding of the interpretation and distribution of logophoric self-forms. I approached the problem from the perspective of the hypothesis that those forms are semantically equivalent to intensifier constructions, and I adopted the semantics of intensifiers proposed by Hole (1999, 2002a). This standpoint required that I should explain in how far DPs contrasting with the validator of a given discourse segment can be conceived of as functions of that validator, and I have tried to provide an answer to this question.

I believe that some of the issues discussed in this paper allow us to reconsider a number of questions relating to reference and denotation in a new light. For example, the question arises in how far logophoric contexts are different from non-logophoric ones, as far as the interpretation of DPs is concerned. Are DPs in non-logophoric contexts also interpreted relative to an assigned epistemic validator, viz. the speaker? A second question that is probably much more subtle concerns the relation between reference and referential acts on the one hand, and the descriptions used by speakers in those acts on the other. In non-logophoric contexts it is the speaker who refers, and the speaker is also the validator, i.e. s/he is responsible for the attribution of certain properties to the relevant individuals. But who refers in logophoric contexts? Do speakers perform those ‘indirect referential acts’ themselves, using descriptions that are interpreted ‘relative to’ some other individual or validator? Or do they delegate the referential acts themselves to some of their discourse protagonists? I believe that any model of reference and denotation should be able to answer questions like these.

7. References


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